MICHAEL C. ORMSBY 1 United States Attorney Eastern District of Washington 2 IAN L. GARRIQUES Assistant U.S. Attorney 3 402 E. Yakima Ave., Ste. 210 Yakima, WA 98901-2760 4 Telephone: (509) 454-4425 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 8 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NO. 2:03-CR-2023-SAB 9 Respondent, GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO § 2255 PETITION 10 v. PAUL HINES, 11 Petitioner. 12 13 Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through Michael C. Ormsby, United 14 States Attorney for the Eastern District of Washington, and Ian L. Garriques, Assistant 15 United States Attorney, submits the following response in opposition to Petitioner Paul 16 Hines' Section 2255 Petition to Vacate Sentence and for Immediate Release. (ECF No. 17 138). 18 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 On March 11, 2003, a superseding indictment was returned charging Petitioner, 20 Paul E. Hines, in Count 1 with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 21 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(e), and in Count 2, for making a false statement in the 22 acquisition of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). ECF No. 12. On February 23 5, 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to both counts without the benefit of a plea agreement. 24 ECF No. 61. On May 20, 2004, the Court sentenced Defendant to a mandatory minimum 25 of 180 months imprisonment on Count 1 pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act 26 27

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(ACCA) (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)), and to a concurrent term of 120 months imprisonment on Count 2. ECF No. 74. At sentencing, Defendant had conceded that the mandatory minimum of 180 months applied. ECF No. 70 at p. 8; *see also United States v. Hines*, 149 Fed. Appx. 681, 682 (9th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).

On Petitioner's direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his sentence and stated that, "We need not decide whether the district court erred in treating Hines's six burglary convictions as a sufficient predicate for application of the Armed Career Criminal Act because Hines invited any error." *Hines*, 149 Fed. Appx. at 681-82. The Ninth Circuit further stated that:

Hines was fully aware of the effect of the Washington burglary convictions, and there is nothing in the record to indicate lack of awareness of anything material, such as the possibility that the convictions would not have satisfied the requirements for the Armed Career Criminal enhancement had the government submitted all of the papers cognizable under the categorical approach. Thus any error was invited error under the standard we set out in *United States v. Perez.*

Id. The Ninth Circuit found no error in the district court's treating of Petitioner's numerous second degree burglary convictions as violent offenses under ACCA. *Id.*

On July 28, 2009, and October 19, 2009, the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court's subsequent denial of various motions by Petitioner challenging his sentence. C.R. 107, 108. On September 3, 2015, the Court denied a separate motion by Defendant pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 after defense counsel conceded that *Descamps v. United States*, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), was not retroactive. ECF No. 129.

On October 30, 2015, Petitioner filed an emergency motion with the Ninth Circuit seeking permission to file a successive habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) based on the new rule of constitutional law announced in *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which was previously unavailable.

On November 10, 2015, the government filed a response with the Ninth Circuit stating that the court should permit Petitioner to file a successive petition.

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On November 20, 2015, the Ninth Circuit filed an order authorizing Petitioner to file a successive § 2255 petition. Petitioner filed the instant petition before this Court on the same day.

II. ARGUMENT

The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") mandates a minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment and permits a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a felon who possesses a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and who has at least three qualifying predicate convictions of either a "violent felony" or "serious drug offense." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). If the ACCA does not apply, the maximum sentence that may be imposed for a violation of Section 922(g)(1) is 10 years imprisonment. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Thus, if a court erroneously concludes that the ACCA applies, then the result would be the imposition of a sentence that is at least 5 years longer than the authorized maximum for the crime. Sentences that exceed the otherwise-applicable statutory maximum for a crime are fundamentally defective.

Pursuant to ACCA's "enumerated offenses" clause, the term "violent felony" includes, among other things, "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that [. . .] (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Here, Petitioner has six (6) second degree burglary convictions and one (1) attempted second degree burglary conviction. As set forth below, all of defendant's preceding convictions qualify as an ACCA "violent felony" based on the enumerated offense of burglary. Therefore, Petitioner's actual innocence argument set forth in his petition must fail.

A. Defendant's Second Degree Burglary Convictions and RCW § 9A.52.030

Petitioner's Washington State convictions for second degree burglary (RCW § 9A.52.030) are as follows:

1. 1989 Convictions in Grays Harbor County Superior Court

On May 1, 1989, Petitioner was found guilty of five (5) counts of second degree burglary and one (1) count of attempted second degree burglary in the Grays Harbor County Superior Court of Washington. The Information, Statement of Defendant on Submission of Case for Trial on the Record, Judgment and Sentence, and Amended Judgment and Sentence are attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

2. 1998 Conviction in Spokane County Superior Court

On July 14, 1998, Petitioner was found guilty of one (1) count of second degree burglary in the Spokane County Superior Court of Washington. The Information, Amended Information, Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty, Judgment and Sentence, and Amended Judgment and Sentence are attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

3. The Washington Statute at the Time of Conviction

At the time of Petitioner's second degree burglary convictions in Grays Harbor County in 1989, RCW § 9A.52.030 provided as follows:

A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle.

RCW § 9A.52.030 (1989); see State of Washington v. Lira, 726 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). At the time of his second degree burglary conviction in Spokane County in 1998, RCW § 9A.52.030 was revised slightly to state as follows:

A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or a dwelling.

RCW § 9A.52.030 (1998). In both 1989 and 1998, the term "building" was further defined by Washington statute as follows:

Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale or deposit of goods; each unit of a building consisting of two or more units

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separately secured or occupied is a separate building. RCW § 9A.04.110(5).

F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2003).

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B. Washington State Convictions for Second Degree Burglary Qualify as the ACCA Predicates of "Burglary" Under the Modified Categorical Approach.

Generic federal burglary is "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime." Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). Washington State's burglary statutes, however, define buildings to also include "fenced area[s], vehicle[s], railway car[s], [and] cargo container[s]," not just buildings per se. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.04.110(5). Because of the breadth of the physical areas covered by the statute, second degree burglary in Washington is not categorically a generic "burglary." See United States v. Wenner, 351

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1. Washington Burglary Always Contains an Element of Unlawful Entry

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issue had no requirement of an unlawful entry into (or unlawful remaining in) a premises.

In Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), the California statute at

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Under that statute, a person can be convicted of burglary even if he lawfully entered a building and was always permitted to be inside, provided he had the requisite criminal

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intent. Thus, a simple shoplifting case could be prosecuted as burglary. *Descamps*, 133 S.

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Ct. at 2282.

By contrast, Washington law provides that "[a] person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle." Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.030. "Enters or remains unlawfully" is further defined: "[a] person 'enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he or she is not then licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to so enter or remain." Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.010(5) (1989).

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That precisely describes Washington's burglary statute, as "[t]here are two alternatives

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means to commit burglary: unlawfully entering a building with intent to commit a crime, or unlawfully remaining in a building with intent to commit a crime." *State v. Gonzales*, 148 P.3d 1046, 1049 (Wash. App. 2006).

Unlike the statute in *Descamps*, Washington law does not allow a person lawfully on the premises to be convicted of burglary; a person must either enter unlawfully, or he must remain unlawfully after his license to enter has been revoked. *See id.; see also State v. Collins*, 751 P.2d 837, 841 (Wash. 1988) (Washington permits a conviction for burglary following a lawful entry only if the defendant remains unlawfully after his license to enter is revoked). The element of the Washington statute is not materially different from the corresponding element of generic burglary: "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure." *Taylor*, 495 U.S. at 598. Thus, the over breadth problem presented in *Descamps* is not implicated.

2. As it Pertains to "Building," the Washington Burglary Statute is Divisible, and Petitioner's Burglary Conviction is a Violent Felony Under the Modified Categorical Approach.

Under *Descamps*, the modified categorical approach may be used where a statute "lists multiple, alternative elements," one of which corresponds to the generic crime. 133 S. Ct. at 2285. In *Descamps*, the Supreme Court made clear that an overbroad definition of building -- one that includes structures beyond the generic definition -- is the paradigm example of a divisible burglary statute. *Descamps*, 133 S. Ct. at 2284-85. Indeed, *Shepard*, the seminal modified categorical decision, concerned an overbroad definition of building that included the generic definition, along with other non-permanent structures. *See Shepard*, 544 U.S. at 25-26. Such is the case with Washington's definition which provides: "Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any dwelling, fenced area, vehicle, railway car, cargo container, or any other structure used for lodging of persons or for carrying on business therein, or for the use, sale, or deposit of goods."

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.04.110(5). "Because the statue provide[s] a finite list of

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definitions," one of which includes the generic definition of a building, the statute is divisible, and one can "determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction" using the modified categorical approach. *Descamps*, 133 S. Ct. at 2285.

Petitioner fails to note that in another case the Ninth Circuit held that Washington State second degree burglary constitutes an ACCA "violent felony" under the modified categorical approach even after *Descamps*. In a post-*Descamps* unpublished decision, the Ninth Circuit concluded in *United States v. Brooks* that a defendant's conviction for second-degree burglary under Washington Revised Code § 9A.52.030(1) qualified as a predicate offense for purposes of the ACCA. *United States v. Brooks*, 532 F. App'x 670, 671 (9th Cir. June 25, 2013) (unpublished).

The Brooks court noted a conviction under § 9A.52.030(1) "is not categorically an ACCA predicate offense because the definition of 'building' under Washington law contains alternatives that are not included in the generic definition of burglary under federal law." Id. (citing United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 972-73 (9th Cir. 2003)). However, the court found the district court did not err when it looked to the defendant's "Shepard documents, his amended information and plea agreement" and found they "indicate[d] ... [the defendant] pleaded guilty to 'enter[ing] or remain[ing] unlawfully in a building located at 115 Orchard Ave. So., Eatonville, known as the residence of G[] K[]." Id. The district court concluded the documents it examined "describe[d] the burglary of a 'building' as the term is defined generically"; the defendant's "conviction necessarily rested on the building's description because the State was required to prove that [the defendant] entered or remained in something that matched at least one definition of 'building' in the statute"; and "[b]ecause the statute provided a finite list of definitions, the district court could determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction." Id. (quotations omitted). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded the district court did not err when it concluded the defendant "was an armed career criminal

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and enhanc[ed] his sentence under the ACCA." *Id*.

Petitioner also asks this Court to place great weight on the district court decisions in Summers v. Feather, 2015 WL 4663277 (D. Or. Aug. 5, 2015), and Murray v. United States, 2015 WL 7313882 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2015). Those district courts essentially found the Washington State second degree burglary statute to be a non-divisible statute and therefore not subject to the modified categorical approach. Nevertherless, petitioner fails to note that in 2015, the district court for the District of Arizona, found the exact opposite and denied a similar ACCA habeas petition. See Davidson v. McClintock, 13-CV-004-TUC-FRZ (DTF), 2015 WL 1469775 (D. Ariz. March 31, 2015). In *Davidson*, the district court held that:

Here, the Washington second degree burglary statute is a divisible statute, in that the definition of building provides alternatives, i.e., the unlawful entry can be into a dwelling, vehicle, or other structures if used for specified purposes. *Descamps* did not alter the analysis for Petitioner's case and the Court, above, applied the modified categorical approach as approved in *Descamps* for divisible statutes.

Davidson, 2015 WL 1469775 at 4.1

In another post-Descamps district court decision, the District Court for the District of Oregon held that Washington State second degree burglary constituted the ACCA predicate of "burglary" under the modified categorical approach. See United States v. *Korzybski*, 3:13-CV-01409-BR, 2013 WL 6592145 at *6 (D. Or. December 16, 2013)

¹ To the extent that Petitioner might contend that *Davidson* is inapplicable because it predates the Supreme Court's striking of the ACCA residual clause in *Johnson v*. *United States*, such an argument would be without merit. *Davidson*, as well as, *Summers* and Murray, considered whether Washington second degree burglary constitutes a "violent felony" under ACCA's enumerated offense clause which includes the term "burglary." The cases do not analyze Washington burglary under the residual clause.

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(modified categorical approach applied to Washington second degree burglary that qualified as ACCA predicate).

Petitioner's reliance on *United States v. Dixon*, 2015 WL 7422615 (9th Cir. Nov. 20. 2015), is also unpersuasive. That case dealt with the crime of robbery in a different state, not the crime of burglary in Washington State, which is the issue here.

Brooks, Davidson, and Koryzbski were all decided post-Descamps, and the courts found the Descamps decision did nothing to upset the determination by the Ninth Circuit that Washington's second degree burglary statute is divisible and requires a modified categorical analysis. In fact, Descamps reaffirms the application of the modified categorical approach and the use of court documents to review statute's like the one at issue in this case, where the Court provided:

To explain when courts should resort to that approach, we hypothesized a statute with alternative elements—more particularly, a burglary statute (otherwise conforming to the generic crime) that prohibits "entry of an automobile as well as a building." [Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602]. One of those alternatives (a building) corresponds to an element in generic burglary, whereas the other (an automobile) does not. In a typical case brought under the statute, the prosecutor charges one of those two alternatives and the judge instructs the jury accordingly. So if the case involves entry into a building, the jury is "actually required to find all the elements of generic burglary," as the categorical approach demands. *Ibid.* But the statute alone does not disclose whether that has occurred.

Because the statute is "divisible"—*i.e.*, comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime—a later sentencing court cannot tell, without reviewing something more, if the defendant's conviction was for the generic (building) or non-generic (automobile) form of burglary. Hence *Taylor* permitted sentencing courts, as a tool for implementing the categorical approach, to examine a limited class of documents to determine which of a statute's alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant's prior conviction.

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284. The reasoning in Descamps supports the Ninth

Circuit holding in *Brooks*, and in this case, where the Washington State second

degree burglary statute includes alternatives for the definition of building. The

Court must review the court documents using the modified categorical approach to

determine if the defendant was actually convicted of the burglary of a "building or structure." In this case, Petitioner's records establish that the locations of his burglaries qualify as buildings or structures for the purpose of the ACCA enhancement.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the terms of a charging document can establish a conviction of generic burglary under *Taylor* by using the term "building" together with a street address and business name. *United States v. Snyder*, 643 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir. 2011); *United States v. Stephens*, 237 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (indictment's use of the term "building" or "dwelling," without further qualification, along with a specific street address, clearly alleged a generic building under *Taylor*.).

Here, all of Petitioner's second degree burglary convictions constitute the generic offense of burglary based on the modified categorical approach. With regard to the six (6) second degree burglary convictions² in Grays Harbor County set forth in Exhibit 1, the Information and the Amended Judgment and Sentence show that in each of the six counts of conviction, Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of the elements that he:

- (1) with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein;
- (2) did enter and remain unlawfully;
- (3) in a building (each building being described and further identified by address).

Ex. 1. In his signed Statement of Defendant on Submission of Case for Trial on the Record, Petitioner also acknowledged and agreed that he was: "charged with the crime(s)

² Petitioner's six convictions in Grays County are separate offenses for purposes of the ACCA predicate conviction analysis because they were "committed on occasions different from one another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); *United States v. Antonie*, 953 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. 1991).

commit a crime therein." *Id.* (emphasis added). He also stipulated that: "I have reviewed the reports, documents, and exhibits to be submitted to the court and agree that they constitute the entire record to be considered by the court in determining my guilt or innocence in this case." *Id.*With regard to the one Spokane County second degree burglary conviction set

of Burglary in the Second Degree (five counts) and Attempted Burglary in the Second

Degree (one count) the elements of which are unlawful entry into a building with intent to

With regard to the one Spokane County second degree burglary conviction set forth in Exhibit 2, the Amended Information and the Amended Judgment and Sentence show that in each of the count of conviction, Petitioner was charged with and found guilty of the elements that he:

- (1) with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein;
- (2) did enter and remain unlawfully;
- (3) in the building of Heffling's Farm Supply located at 5420 North Market.
- Ex. 2. In his signed Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty, Petitioner also stipulated that: "*I unlawfully entered a business* with intent to steal that was not my own." *Id.* (emphasis added).

Based on the foregoing, all of defendant's second degree burglary convictions in Grays County and Spokane County constitute the enumerated offense of "burglary" under ACCA.

In addition, as to all of his burglary convictions in Spokane and Grays County, the parties stipulated that the element proceeded on was that defendant unlawfully entered a building. See Ex. 1 and 2 (Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty). Thus, Petitioner's reference to the overbroad charging language issue found in *United States v. Wilkinson*, 589 Fed.Appx. 348 (9th Cir. 2014) (unpublished), is inapposite.

In sum, Petitioner has failed to show his sentencing innocence under ACCA, and his motion to vacate his sentence should therefore be denied.

DATED: December 8, 2015

Respectfully submitted, MICHAEL C. ORMSBY United States Attorney

By: /s/ Ian L. Garriques
IAN L. GARRIQUES
Assistant U.S. Attorney

I hereby certify that on December 8, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF System which will send notification of such filing to the following: Alison K. Guernsey.

/s/ Ian L. Garriques IAN L. GARRIQUES Assistant U.S. Attorney

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H. STEWARD MENEFEE
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Hines Control Country 2018

unlawfully in the building housing Pioneer Florist, 306 W Wishkah, Aberdeen, Washington;

CONTRARY TO RCW 9A.52 030 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.

COUNT III

And I, H Steward Menefee, Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid, by and through Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Gerald R Fuller, further do accuse the defendant of the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree, a crime of the same or similar character as alleged in Counts I & II, committed as follows:

That the said Paul E. Hines in Grays Harbor County, Washington, on or about the 18th day of February 1989, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, did enter and remain unlawfully in the building housing Harbor Health Club, 200 W State, Aberdeen, Washington;

CONTRARY TO RCW 9A.52.030 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.

COUNT IV

And I, H Steward Menefee, Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid, by and through Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Gerald R Fuller, further do accuse the defendant of the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree, a crime of the same or similar character as alleged in Counts I-III, committed as follows:

That the said Paul E Hines in Grays Harbor County, Washington, on or about the 7th day of February 1989, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, did enter and remain unlawfully in the building housing Superior Auto Body, 318 E. State Street, Aberdeen, Washington;

CONTRARY TO RCW 9A 52 030 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington

H. STEWARD MENEFEE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Hines Court Control 35

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COUNT V

And I, H. Steward Menefee, Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid, by and through Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Gerald R. Fuller, further do accuse the defendant of the crime of Burglary in the Second Degree, a crime of the same or similar character as alleged in Counts I-IV, committed as follows:

That the said Paul E Hines in Grays Harbor County, Washington, on or about the 22th day of February 1989, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, did enter and remain unlawfully in the building housing Shakey's, Sumner Avenue, Aberdeen, Washington;

CONTRARY TO RCW 9A 52 030 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.

COUNT VI

And I, H Steward Menefee, Prosecuting Attorney aforesaid, by and through Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Gerald R. Fuller, further do accuse the defendant of the crime of Attempted Burglary in the Second Degree, a crime of the same or similar character as alleged in Counts I-V, committed as follows:

That the said Paul E Hines, in Grays Harbor County, Washington, on or about February 20, 1989, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, did attempt to enter and remain unlawfully in the building housing the Harbor Dental Center, 116 E. Wishkah;

CONTRARY TO RCW 9A 52.030 and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington

H. STEWARD MENEFEE
Prosecuting Attorney
for Grays Harbor County

GERALD R FULLER/
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

GRF/lt

Certificate of Clerk of the S Washington in and for Gray. The above is a true and corroriginal instrument which is record in this court. Done this day of	s Harbor County	E CUPLINOT COVE	
Cheryl Brown, Clerk By	Deputy Clerk	CA ASHINGTON CO	7

IN THE OFFICE OF COUNTY CLERK GRAYS HARDOR CO NA

MAY -1 PI2:50

SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR GRAYS HARBOR COUNTRY CLERK

STATE OF WASHINGTON.

NO. 89-1-44-2

Plaintiff.

Defendant.

HINES, PAUL E

vs.

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ON SUBMISSION OF CASE FOR

- My true name is PAUL E HINES 1.
- My age is 19 2. Date of birth
- I went through the -lgrade in school.
- I have been informed and fully understand that I have the right to representation by a lawyer and that if I cannot afford to pay for a lawyer, one will be provided at no expense to me My lawyer's name is WILLIAM MORGAN
- I have been informed and fully understand that I am charged with the crime(s) of Burglary in the Second Degree (five counts) and Attempted Burglary in the Second Degree (one count) the elements of which are unlawful entry into a building with intent to commit a crime therein and that the maximum sentence(s) for which are: Burglary Second Degree - Ten years in prison, \$20,000 fine; Attempted Burglary - five years in prison, \$10,000 fine

In addition, I understand that I may have to pay restitution for crime(s) for which I am found guilty and for any other uncharged crime(s) for which I have agreed to pay restitution, as well as the costs and court-appointed attorney fees of the action. The standard sentence range for the crime is 43-57 months based upon my criminal history which I understand the Prosecuting Attorney says to be: See Attached Form 6. I (agree) (do not agree) that I have the criminal convictions listed above

() Criminal history attached as Appendix ____ and incorporated by reference

I have been given a copy of the Information.

- I have been informed and fully understand that:
 - (a) I have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed.
 - (b) I have the right to remain silent before and during trial, and I need not testify against myself
 - (c) I have the right at trial to hear and question any witnesses who testify against me
 - (d) I have the right at trial to have witnesses testify for me. These witnesses can be made to appear at no expense to me.
 - (e) I am presumed innocent until the charge(s) is (are) proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or I enter a plea of guilty.
 - (f) I have the right to appeal a determination of guilt after a trial
 - (g) If I submit this matter for trial on the record, I give up the rights in (a), (c), and (d) of this paragraph 6
- 7. I make this submission of this case for a trial on the record freely and voluntarily
- 8. No one has threatened harm of any kind to me or to any other person to cause me to submit this matter for trial on the record.
- 9. No person has made promises of any kind to cause me to

submit this case for trial on the record except as set forth in this statement.

- I have been informed and fully understand that the Prosecuting Attorney will make the following recommendations to the court 57 months on Counts I through IV, 48 months on Count VI, file no other charges from known reports.
- I have been informed and fully understand that the standard sentencing range is based on the crime charged and my criminal history. Criminal history includes prior convictions, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere. Criminal history also includes convictions or quilty pleas at juvenile court that are felonies and which were committed when I was fifteen years of age or older. Juvenile convictions count only if I was less than twenty-three years of age at the time I committed this present offense. I fully understand that if criminal history in addition to that listed in paragraph 5 is discovered, both the standard sentence range and the Prosecuting Attorney's recommendation may increase. Even so, I fully understand that my submission of this case for trial on the record is binding upon me if accepted by the court, and I cannot change my mind if additional criminal history is discovered and the standard sentence range (and the Prosecuting Attorney's recommendation) increase(s).
- 12. I have been informed and fully understand that the court does not have to follow anyone's recommendation as to sentence I have been fully informed and fully understand that the court must impose a sentence within the standard sentence range unless the

court finds substantial and compelling reasons not to do so If the court goes outside the standard sentence range, either I or the state can appeal that sentence If the sentence is within the standard sentence range, no one can appeal the sentence.

- 13. I understand that if I am on probation, parole, or community supervision, a finding of guilty to the present charge(s) will be sufficient grounds for a Judge to revoke my probation or community supervision or for the Parole Board to revoke my parole.
- 14. I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States, a finding of guilty to an offense punishable as a crime under state law is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.
- 15. I have reviewed the reports, documents, and exhibits to be submitted to the court and agree that they constitute the entire record to be considered by the court in determining my guilt or innocence in this case.
- 16. I understand that if I submit this matter to the court on the record it is final. Once the submission on the record is accepted, I cannot change my mind at a later time.
- I have read or have had read to me and fully understand all of the numbered sections above (1 through 16) and have received a copy of this "Statement of Defendant for Submission of Case for

Trial on the Record" form. I have no further questions to ask of the court

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

Attorney for Defendar

The foregoing statement was read by me or to the defendant and signed by the defendant in the presence of his or her attorney, and the undersigned Judge, in open court. The court finds the defendant's submission on the record to be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made, that the court has informed the defendant of the nature of the charge and the consequences of submitting this matter for trial on the record.

DATED:

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Certificate of Clerk of the Superior Court of Washington in and for Grays Harbor County. The above is a true and correct copy of the original instrument which is on file or of	IN THE OF COUN	LED OFFICE ITY C'ERK VBC CC ('A			AIL & F . O. (
record in this court. Done this day of day of day of	MU 98°	14 P1:24		—— s. ——— Pi	. C. 70s,
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E OF WASHINGTON			GRAYS HARBO	R COUNTY	
Plainti	ff,) NO.	89-1-44-2	89 28	942
Vs		,	MENT AND SEN		:)
PAUL E. HINES,) DOB:) SID:) FBI:			
Defenda) SEX:)	male RA	CE:	
	I.	<u>HEARING</u>			

- 1.1 A sentencing hearing in this case was held L/14/89
- 1.2 Present were the defendant, his/her counsel, William Morgan and Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Gerald R Fuller
- 1 3 The State has moved for dismissal of Count(s)____.
- 1 4 The court finds there exists no legal cause as to why judgment should not be pronounced.

II <u>FINDING</u>

2.1 CURRENT OFFENSE(S): The defendant was found guilty on May 1,1999 by non-jury trial of:

Count I: Burglary Second Degree 2/20/89 9A.52.030 Count II: Burglary Second Degree 2/22/89 9A 52.030 Count III: Burglary Second Degree 2/18/89 9A 52.030 Count IV: Burglary Second Degree 2/7/89 9A 52.030 Count V: Burglary Second Degree 2/22/89 9A.52.030 Count V: Att Burglary Second Degree 2/20/89 9A.52.030 Count VI Att Burglary Second Degree 2/20/89 9A.52.030/9A.28.020

- [] With a special verdict/finding for use of deadly weapon on Count(s):
- [] Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and counting as one crime in determining the offender score are:
- [] Additional current offenses are attached in Appendix.

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

KHIBIT 1

2 2 CRIMINAL HISTORY. The defendant's criminal history is (as stipulated by the parties at the time of plea) (as set forth below):

See attached form 6 - and exhibit 1 st sentencing

[] Additional criminal history is attached in Appendix.

2.3 SENTENCING DATA:

Offe <u>Scor</u>	nder e	Seriousness <u>Level</u>	Range	Maximum <u>Term</u>
Count I:	13	π	43-57	Class B
Count II:	13	${I\!\!I}$	43-57	ч
Count III:	13	I	43-57	u
Count IV:	13	IL	43-57	•
Count V:	13	工	43-57	1 1
Count VI:	13	II	3214-4214	Class C

[] Additional current offense sentencing information is attached in Appendix.

2.4 EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE:

- [] Substantial and compelling reasons exist which justify a sentence (above) (below) the standard range for Count(s). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the attached appendix.
- 2 5 CATEGORY OF OFFENDER: The defendant is:
- (A) An offender who shall be sentenced to confinement over one year.

III. JUDGMENT

The defendant is guilty of the crime(s) as set forth in Findings 2.1

IV. ORDER

It is ordered that defendant serve the determinate sentence and abide by the conditions set forth below.

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE EXHIBIT 1 Hines Convictions 50

1.1	Defenda	ant shall pay to the Clerk of this Court:
	() (x)	A. Filing Fee \$70 B. Recoupment of Expenses 1. Witness Fee \$ 2. Sheriff's Return \$ 3. Extradition Costs \$ 4. Investigation Costs \$ 5. Other (specify) \$
		C. Crime Victim Assessment \$70. D. Restitution (joint and several with codefendants) to and amount: Harbor Dental Center, 116 E Wishkah, Aberdeen \$210.18. [Schedule of restitution is attached [] To be determined
	4	E. Indigent attorney fees in the amount of
	()	\$\line \text{OO}^{\cdot}. F. Fine of \$\frac{1}{2}. G. \$\frac{1}{2} \text{ to the } \text{ Drug} Control Fund.
	K	H. Payments shall be made in the following manner [] \$ per month [] As set by defendant's community corrections
	(1)	defendant for a period of ten (10) years to assure
	4	payment of the above monetary obligations. J. Clerk shall credit all payments to restitution first.
4.2	[] T	he Court dismisses Count(s)
	otal co	EMENT OVER ONE YEAR: Defendant is sentenced to a term nfinement in the custody of the Department of as follows commencing, 19:
	72	_(days) (months) on Count I. 72 months on CfII (days) (months) on Count II. 72 months on CfII (days) (months) on Count III. 72 months on CfII
		The terms in Count numbers are concurrent for a total term of 72 months. The terms in Count numbers are consecutive for a total term of months. The sentence herein shall run (concurrently) (consecutively) with sentence in Cause No

[\frac{1}{2869}] (as computed by jail staff).

The following Appendices are attached to this Judgment and Sentence and are incorporated by reference:

		•
ſ	1	Additional criminal history.
ĭ	i	Additional current offense sentencing information
į	i	Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for
•	•	an exceptional sentence.
[1	Schedule of restitution.
-	i	Other:

Approved as to form:

Presented by:

(Deputy) Prosecuting Attorney

- State : Hines Restitution) Harlies Health Club 200 w State, Aberdeen \$ 185,96
- \$2750 for momance deductible
- Former Insurance et Supuran Auto B. dy El Jun Andrews, Agent 600 E Wishkah, Alberdeen Policy # 600383977 as approved
- 4 David Scaggins & Superior Anto Body -\$2713 43
- Misty's Restaurant 116 W Heron, Ab -

1.1 A sentencing hearing in this case was held:

1.2 Present were the defendant, his/her counsel, William Morgan and Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Gerald R. Fuller

The State has moved for dismissal of Count(s)

The court finds there exists no legal cause as to why judgment should not be pronounced.

II. **FINDING**

2.1 CURRENT OFFENSE(S): The defendant was found guilty on May 1, 1989 by non-jury trial of:

Offense Date RCW Burglary Second Degree 2/20/89 9A 52 030 Count II: Burglary Second Degree 2/22/89 9A 52.030 Count III: Burglary Second Degree 2/18/89 9A 52.030 Count IV: Burglary Second Degree 2/7/89 9A 52.030 Count V: Burglary Second Degree 2/22/89 9A 52 030 Count VI: Att. Burglary Second Degree 2/20/89 9A.52 030/ 9A 28 020

- [] With a special verdict/finding for use of deadly weapon on Count(s):
- Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and counting as one crime in determining the offender score are:
- Additional current offenses are attached in Appendix

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

Hines Convictions 58

2.2 CRIMINAL HISTORY. The defendant's criminal history is (as stipulated by the parties at the time of plea) (as set forth below):

Crime Sentence Adult or Date Juv. crime

See attached form 6 and exhibit #1 at sentencing.

[] Additional criminal history is attached in Appendix.

2 3 SENTENCING DATA

		fender ore	Seriousness <u>Level</u>	<u>Range</u>	Maximum Term
Count	I:	13	II	43-57	Class B
Count	II:	13	II	43-57	Class B
Count	III	13	II	43-57	Class B
Count	IV:	13	II	43-57	Class B
Count	v:	13	II	43-57	Class B
Count	VI:	13	II :	321-421	Class C

[] Additional current offense sentencing information is attached in Appendix.

2 4 EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE:

[] Substantial and compelling reasons exist which justify a sentence (above) (below) the standard range for Count(s). Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are stated in the attached appendix.

2 5 CATEGORY OF OFFENDER: The defendant is:

(A) An offender who shall be sentenced to confinement over one year.

III. JUDGMENT

The defendant is guilty of the crime(s) as set forth in Findings 2.1.

IV. ORDER

It is ordered that defendant serve the determinate sentence and abide by the conditions set forth below JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE EXHIBIT 1 Hines Convictions 59

4.1	efend	dant	shall pay to the Clerk of this Court:
	(X)	A. B.	Filing Fee \$70 Recoupment of Expenses: 1 Witness Fee \$
	(X) (X)	C D.	Crime Victim Assessment \$70. Restitution (joint and several with codefendants) to and amount: Harbor Dental Center, 116 E. Wishkah, Aberdeen \$210.18. [X] Schedule of additional restitution is attacked. [V] To be determined.
	(X)	E	Indigent attorney fees in the amount of \$600
	()	F.	Fine of C
	()	G.	Fine of \$ \$ to the Drug Control Fund
	(X)	l J	Payments shall be made in the following manner: \$ per month. As set by defendant's community corrections
	(X)	ı.	officer upon release. This court shall retain jurisdiction over the defendant for a period of ten (10) years to assure the control of the court of t
	(X)	J	payment of the above monetary obligations. Clerk shall credit all payments to restitution first
4 2 [) T	he Co	ourt dismisses Count(s)
OT COC	at co	nrane	OVER ONE YEAR: Defendant is sentenced to a termement in the custody of the Department of follows commencing
Mes	57 51 51		months) on Count I 57 months on Ct. IV. (months) on Count II 54 months on Ct V (months) on Count III. 42/2 months on Ct VI.
		TOTA	terms in Count numbers I-W are concurrent for a laterm of 57 months.
	[]	The	terms in Count numbers are consecutive for
		a cc	cai term of months.
	[]	The	sentence herein shall run (concurrently) usecutively) with sentence in Cause No.
		(501	Hines Convictions 60
JUDGMEN	IT ANI	SEN	TRACE

[X] Credit is given for time served (____days) from 2/28/89 (as computed by jail staff).

The following Appendices are attached to this Judgment and Sentence and are incorporated by reference:

[]	Additional	criminal	history.

- [] Additional current offense sentencing information.
- [] Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for an exceptional sentence
- [] Schedule of restitution.
- [] Other:

DATED:

Presented by

(Deputy) Prosecuting Attorney

Approved as to form

hom hungan

Attorney for Defendant

State. Henre - Rostitution

-) Harlon Health Club 200 w State, Aberdeen \$ 185.96
- \$2750 for momance diductible
- E) Farmer Insurance et Superior Auto b. dy E/c. Jim Andrews, Agent 600 E 10'shkal. Alberdeen Policy # 600383477 — as approved
- 4 David Scaggins & Superun Anto Birdy \$2713 43
- Musty's Restaurant 116 W Herry Ab -

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

FILED

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SPOKANE

APR 1 3 1998

THOMAS R. FALLQUIST SPOKANE COUNTY CLERK

STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff.

INFORMATION

NO. 98100786 - 0

SHANE D. SMITH

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

PAUL EDWARD HINES

v.

JASON JOSEPH MAZZARESE

Defendant(s)

PA# 98-9-97773-0 RPT# 02-98-78603 RCW 9A.52.030-F (#17711)

Comes now the Prosecuting Attorney in and for Spokane County, Washington, and charges the defendant(s) with the following crime(s):

SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY, committed as follows: That the defendants, PAUL EDWARD HINES and JASON JOSEPH MAZZARESE, in Spokane County, Washington, on or about March 25, 1998, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, did enter and remain unlawfully in the building of Heffling's Farm Supply, located at 5420 North Market,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney WSBA#25196

DEFENDANT INFORMATION: PAUL EDWARD HINES

DOL #:

SID #: 013200147

State:

DOC #:

INFORMATION 1

JAMES R. SWEETSER
Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney
County-City Public Safety Building
Spokane, WA 99260

EXHIBIT 2

Hines Convictions 1

FILED

JUN 1 9 1998

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGT COUNTY CLERK

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SPOKANE

STATE OF WASHINGTON,)	AMENDED INFORMATION
Plaintiff,)	NO. 98-1-00786-0
v.	SHANE D. SMITH Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
PAUL EDWARD HINES) WM 070869)	
Defendant(s)	PA# 98-9-97773-0 RPT# 02-98-78603 RCW CT I: 9A.52.030-F (#17711) CT II: 9A.48.080(1)(a)-F (#04339)

Comes now the Prosecuting Attorney in and for Spokane County, Washington, and charges the defendant(s) with the following crime(s):

COUNT I: SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY, committed as follows: That the defendant, PAUL EDWARD HINES, in Spokane County, Washington, on or about March 25, 1998, with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, did enter and remain unlawfully in the building of Heffling's Farm Supply, located at 5420 North Market,

And the Prosecuting Attorney, as aforesaid, further charges the defendant, PAUL EDWARD HINES, with the crime of SECOND DEGREE MALICIOUS MISCHIEF, committed as follows: That the defendant, PAUL EDWARD HINES, in Spokane County, Washington, on or about March 25, 1998, did knowingly and maliciously cause physical damage in excess of \$250 to two windows and a metal hasp of the building located at 5420 North Market, the property of Heffling's Farm Supply,

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

DEFENDANT INFORMATION: PAUL EDWARD HINES

Address:

Height: Hair:

State:

DOL #: SID #:

013200147

DOC #:

JAMES R. SWEETSER

Spokane County Prosecuting Attorney County-City Public Safety Building

Spokane, WA 99260

	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON FILED
	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SPOKANE JUL 1 5 1998
THE STATE OF	WASHINGTON,) NO. 98-1-00786-0 SPOKANE COUNTY CLERK
v.	Plaintiff,) PA# 98-9-97773-1) RPT# 02-98-78603) RCW 9A.52.030-F (#17711)
PAUL EDWARD H) STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ON Defendant) PLEA OF GUILTY
1. My tr	rue name is PAVL EOWARD MINES.
2. My ag	e is 27. Date of birth
3. I wen	t through the GED grade.
4. I HAV	E BEEN INFORMED AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT:
	I have the right to representation by a lawyer and that if I cannot afford to pay for a lawyer, one will be provided at no expense to me. My lawyer's name is CHRISTIAN J. PHELPS.
	I am charged with the crime of SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY. The elements of this crime are

- I HAVE BEEN INFORMED AND FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT RIGHTS, AND I GIVE THEM ALL UP BY PLEADING GUILTY:
 - (a) The right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury in the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed;
 - (b) The right to remain silent before and during trial, and the right to refuse to testify against myself;
 - (c) The right at trial to hear and question the witnesses who testify against me;
 - (d) The right at trial to have witnesses testify for me. These witnesses can be made to appear at no expense to me;
 - (e) I am presumed innocent until the charge is proven beyond a reasonable doubt or I enter a plea of guilty;
 - (f) The right to appeal a determination of guilt after a trial.

5.

- 6. IN CONSIDERING THE CONSEQUENCES OF MY GUILTY PLEA, I UNDERSTAND THAT:
 - (a) The crime with which I am charged carries a maximum sentence of 5 years imprisonment and a \$ 10 k fine. The standard sentence range is from 40 months to 57 months confinement, based on the prosecuting attorney's understanding of my criminal history.
 - (b) The standard sentence range is based on the crime charged and my criminal history. Criminal history includes prior convictions, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere. Criminal history also includes convictions in juvenile court for felonies or serious traffic offenses that were committed when I was 15 years of age or older. Juvenile convictions, except those for class A felonies, count only if I was less than 23 years old when I committed the crime to which I am now pleading guilty.
 - (c) The prosecuting attorney's statement of my criminal history is attached to this agreement. Unless I have attached a different statement, I agree that the prosecuting attorney's statement is correct and complete. If I have attached my own statement, I assert that it is correct and complete. If I am convicted of any additional crimes between now and the time I am sentenced, I am obligated to tell the sentencing judge about those convictions.
 - (d) If I am convicted of any new crimes before sentencing, or if any additional criminal history is discovered, both the standard sentence range and the prosecuting attorney's recommendation may increase. Even so, my plea of guilty to this charge is binding on me. I cannot change my mind if additional criminal history is discovered even though the standard sentencing range and the prosecuting attorney's recommendation increase, and even though a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is required by law.
 - (e) In addition to sentencing me to confinement for the standard range, the judge will order me to pay some as a victim's compensation fund assessment. If this crime resulted in injury to any person or damage to or loss of property, the judge will order me to make restitution, unless extraordinary circumstances exist which make restitution inappropriate. The judge may also order that I pay a fine, court costs, and attorney fees. Furthermore, the judge may place me on community supervision, impose restrictions on my activities, and order me to perform community service.

(f)	The prosecuting to the judge:	attorney will make 43 months	the following	recommendation

- (g) The judge does not have to follow anyone's recommendation as to sentence. The judge must impose a sentence within the standard range unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons not to do so. If the judge goes outside the standard range, either I or the State can appeal that sentence. If the sentence is within the standard range, no one can appeal the sentence.
- (h) The crime(s) of SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY has a mandatory minimum sentence of at least years of total confinement. The law does not allow any reduction of this sentence. This mandatory minimum sentence is not the same as the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole described in paragraph 6(q) [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
- (i) I am being sentenced for two or more violent offenses arising from separate and distinct criminal conduct and the sentences imposed on counts and will run consecutively unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to do otherwise. [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
- (j) In addition to confinement, the judge will sentence me to community placement for at least 1 year. During the period of community placement, I will be under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, and I will have restrictions placed on my activities. [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
 - (k) The judge may sentence me as a first time offender instead of giving a sentence within the standard range if I qualify under RCW 9.94%.030(20). This sentence could include as much as 90 days' confinement plus all of the conditions described in paragraph (e). Additionally, the judge could require me to undergo treatment, to devote time to a specific occupation, and to pursue a prescribed course of study or occupational training. [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
- (1) This plea of guilty will result in revocation of my privilege to drive. If I have a driver's license, I must now surrender it to the judge. [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
- (m) If this crime involves a sexual offense, prostitution, or a drug offense associated with hypodermic needles, I will be required to undergo testing for the human immunodeficiency (AIDS) virus. [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
 - (n) If I am not a citizen of the United States, a plea of guilty to an offense punishable as a crime under state law is grounds for deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ON PLEA OF GUILTY (CTR 4.2(G)) (o) If this crime involves a sex offense or a violent offense, I will be required to provide a sample of my blood for purposes of DNA identification analysis. [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]

(p) Because this crime involves a sex offense, I will be required to register with the sheriff of the county of the state of washington where I reside. I must register immediately upon being sentenced unless I am in custody, in which case I must register within 24 hours of my release.

If I leave this state following my sentencing or release from custody but later move back to Washington, I must register within 30 days after moving to this state or within 24 hours after doing so if I am under the jurisdiction of this state's Department of Corrections.

If I change my residence within a county, I must send written notice of my change of residence to the sheriff at lease 14 days before moving and must register again with the sheriff within 24 hours of moving. If I change my residence to a new county within this state, I must send written notice of my change of residence to the sheriff of my new county at least 14 days before moving, register with that sheriff within 24 hours of moving and I must give written notice of my change of address to the sheriff of the county where last registered within 10 days of moving. If I move out of Washington state, I must also send written notice within 10 days of moving to the county sheriff with whom I last registered in Washington state. [If not applicable, these three paragraphs should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]

- (q) This offense is a most serious offense as defined by RCW 9.94A.030(21), and if I have at least two prior convictions for most serious offenses, whether in this state, in federal court, or elsewhere, the crime for which I am charged carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. [If not applicable, this sentence should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge.]
 - I understand that I may not possess, own, or have under my control any firearm unless my right to do so is restored by a court of record and that I must immediately surrender any concealed pistol license. (PURSUANT TO RCW 9.41.047(1), THE JUDGE SHALL READ THIS SECTION TO THE DEFENDANT IN OPEN COURT IF THE DEFENDANT IS PLEADING GUILTY TO A FELONY OR ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CRIMES WHEN COMMITTED BY ONE FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBER AGAINST ANOTHER: ASSAULT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE, COERCION, STALKING, RECKLESS ENDANGERMENT IN THE SECOND DEGREE, CRIMINAL TRESPASS IN THE FIRST DEGREE, OR VIOLATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF A PROTECTION ORDER OR NO-CONTACT ORDER RESTRAINING THE PERSON OR EXCLUDING THE PERSON FROM A RESIDENCE (RCW 25.50.060, 26.50.070, 26.50.130, OR 10.99.040). THE CLERK SHALL FORWARD A COPY OF THE DRFENDANT'S DRIVER'S LICENSE, IDENTICARD, OR COMPARABLE IDENTIFICATION TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LICENSING ALONG WITH THE DATE OF CONVICTION.) [If not applicable, this paragraph should be stricken and initialed by the defendant and the judge].

- 7. I plead Sunty to the crime of SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY as charged in the Information. I have received a copy of that information.
- 8. I make this plea freely and voluntarily.
- 9. No one has threatened harm of any kind to me or to any other person to cause me to make this plea.
- 10. No person has made promises of any kind to cause me to enter this plea except as set forth in this statement.

intent	11. T	11.
inten	_	
	-	

12. My lawyer has explained to me, and we have fully discussed, all of the above paragraphs. I understand them all. I have been given a copy of this "Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty." I have no further questions to ask the judge.

Defendant

I have read and discussed this statement with the defendant and believe that the defendant is competent and fully understands the statement.

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

WSBA #: 25196

Defendant's Lawyer MRS

WSBA#: 25 196)

The foregoing statement was signed by the defendant in open court in the presence of the defendant's lawyer and the undersigned judge. The defendant asserted that [check appropriate box]:

(a) The defendant had previously read; or

(a) The defendant's lawyer had previously read to him or her; or

() (c) An interpreter had previously read to the defendant the entire statement above and that the defendant understood it in full.

I find the defendant's plea of guilty to be knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. Defendant understands the charges and the consequences of the plea. There is a factual basis for the plea. The defendant is guilty as charged.

Dated this 14 day of his ,1998.

Judge RICHARD W. MILLER

I am a certified interpreter or have been found otherwise qualified by the court to interpret in the ______ language which the defendant understands, and I have translated this entire document for the defendant from English into that language. The defendant has acknowledged his or her understanding of both the translation and the subject matter of this document. I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of Washington that the foregoing is true and correct.

	_	Ty	terpr	eter		

Dated this day of ,1998.

DEC 0 3 2015

of the wining on the and of record in my offi

STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ON PLEA OF GUILTY (CrR 4.2(G))

SUPERIOR' COURT OF WAS	N		FILED
AND THE TRANSPORT			յլյ 1 5 1998
STATE OF WASHINGTON POR OF STATE CO. OF STATE CO. OF STATE CO. OF STATE CO.	LERK	NO. 98-1-00786-0	THOMAS R. FALLQUIST SPOKANE COUNTY CLER
₹.		PA# 98-9-97773-1	- OIVAL GOOR! GELIA
PAUL EDWARD HINES,		RPT# 02-98-78603 RCW 9A.52.030-F (#	¥17711)
PAUL EDWARD HINES,			
Defendant.		JUDGMENT AND SENTE [X] Prison	NCE (JS)
SID: 013200147		[] Persistent Offe	ender
		[] Jail One Year	
		[] First Time Offe [] Special Sexual	
		Sentencing Alte	ernative
		[] Special Drug O: Alternative	ffender Sentencing
	ı	HEARING	
1.1 A sentencing hear: lawyer and the dep	ing was held puty prosect	l and the defendant ting attorney were	, the defendant's present.
	II	. FINDINGS	
There being no reason to FINDS:	why judgment	should not be pro	nounced, the Court
2.1 CURRENT OFFENSE(S): The def	endant was found gu	ilty on 7-14-18
] jury verd		
Count No.: I Cri	ime: SECOND DE	GREE BURGLARY	
		2.030-F (#17711)	COURT COST /10
		ime <u>MARCH 25, 1998</u> o. <u>02-98-78603</u>	VICTIM ASSESS 500
•			RESTITUTION 434.5
Count No.: Cri	Lme:		FINE
	RCW Date of Cr	ime	DRUG FUND
	Incident N	o.	ATTY FEES
Count No. 1	ime:		SHERIFF
Count No.: Cr	RCW		OTHER COST
	Date of Cr	ime	
	Incident N	0.	
as charged in the			
		nses are attached	
[] A special ve Count(s)	erdict/findi RCW 9.	ng for use of a fi : 94A.125, .310	rearm was returned of
[] A special ve	erdict/findi returned or	ng for use of a dec Count(s)	adly weapon other the RCW 9.94A.125, .310

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (Felony)
(RCW 9.94A.110, .120) (WPF CR 84.0400 (7/95))

EXHIBIT 2

989040 1 0 8

Hines Convictions 12

- .[] A special verdict/finding of sexual motivation was returned on Count(s) _____. RCW 9.94A.127
- A special verdict/finding for **Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act** was returned on Count(s) _______, RCW 69.50.401 and RCW 69.50.435, taking place in a school, school bus, within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a school grounds or within 1000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district; or in a public park, in a public transit vehicle, or in a public stop shelter.
- The defendant was convicted of **vehicular homicide** which was proximately caused by a person driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or by the operation of a vehicle in a reckless manner and is therefore a violent offense.

 RCW 9.94A.030
- [] Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and counting as one crime in determining the offender score are (RCW 9.94A.400):
- [] Other current conviction listed under different cause numbers used in calculating the offender score are (list offense and cause number):
- 2.2 CRIMINAL HISTORY: Prior convictions constituting criminal history for purposes of calculating the offender score are (RCW 9.94A.360)

Crime	Date of Crime	Crime Type	Adult or Juv	Place of Conviction	Sent. Date
ATMPT BURG 2	022089	NV	A	GRAYS HARBOR CO, WA	061989
BURGLRY 2	020789	NV	A	GRAYS HARBOR CO, WA	061989
PCS	011588	DRUG	A	YAKIMA CO, WA	040888
BURGLARY 2	051486	NV	* 7	YAKIMA CO, WA	050986
BURGLARY 2	031086	NV	A J	YAKIMA CO, WA	050186
BURGLARY 2	012886	NV	AJ	YAKIMA CO, WA	030386
DUI	070896	MISD.	A	SPOKANE CO, WA	121296

- [] Additional criminal history is attached in Appendix 2.2
- [] The defendant committed a current offense while on community placement (adds one point to score). RCW 9.94A.360
- [] The court finds that the following prior convictions are one offense for purposes of determining the offender score (RCW 9.94A.360):

		LEVEL	RANGE (not including enhancemen ts)	enhancement for Firearm (F), other deadly weapon finding (D), or VUCSA (V) in a protected sone	STANDARD RANGE (includi ng enhancem ents)	TERM
Ī	4811	TIL	43-57 MONTHS	NA	42.53	to veas,
ㅗ	В	1115	1231 MANTH)	7 (1)	43-57 morns	\$ 20,000
2.5	ABILITY To considered and future the defendant defendant legal final	mmend a similar of the total and ability to dant's financies status will have the ability ancial obligations of the collowing extensions.	FINANCIAL OF amount owing pay legal resource li change. lity or like ations impost	ing Attorney BLIGATIONS. g, the defend financial obl ces and the l The court fi ely future al sed herein. circumstance RCW 9.94A.142	The court lant's pas igations, ikelihood nds that oility to RCW 9.94A	has t, prese includi that th the pay the
						Sheet Bu
2.6	recommend	ed sentencin	g agreement	us offenses, s or plea agr	reements a	re
	[] attacl	ned or [] a	a lotroma			

paragraph 2.1 and Appendix 2.1 [X] The Court DISMISSES Counts II of American Information

3.3 [] The defendant is found NOT GUILTY of Counts

IV. SENTENCE AND ORD

	\$ 434.56	Restitution to: Hepung's FARM SUFFL	1					
JASS COL	^{DE} \$	Restitution to:	Restitution to:					
RTN/RJN	\$	Restitution to:						
		dress-address may be withheld and provided confiders office)	entially to					
PCV	\$500.00	Victim Assessment RCW 7.68.035						
CRC	\$110.00	Court costs, including: RCW 9.94A. 9.94A.120, 10.01.160, 10.46.190	030,					
		Criminal Filing fee \$						
		Witness costs \$	WFR					
		Sheriff service fees \$	SFR/SFS/SFW/SRF					
		Jury demand fee \$	JFR					
		Other \$						
PUB	\$	Fees for court appointed attorney RCW	9.94A.030					
WRF	\$	Court appointed defense expert and ot costs RCW 9.94A.030						
FCM	\$	Fine RCW 9A.20.021; [] VUCSA addition deferred due to indigency RCW 69.50	ional fine .430					
CDF/LDI FCD/NTF	/\$	Drug enforcement fund ofRCW 9.94A.030						
CLF	\$	Crime lab fee [] deferred due to inc RCW 43.43.690	ligency					
EXT	\$	Extradition costs RCW 9.94A.120						
	\$	Emergency response costs (Vehicular) Vehicular Homicide only, \$1,000 maxim RCW 38.52.430	Assault, mum)					
	\$	Other costs for:						
[]	The above total	TOTAL RCW 9.94A.145 does not include all restitution or other ations, which may be set by later order tution order may be entered. RCW 9.94A.	of the court.					
	restitution hea	ring: et by the prosecutor ed for						

[],	RESTITUTION. Sch attached, Appendix 4.
[*]	Restitution ordered above shall be paid jointly and severally with: NAME of other defendant CAUSE NUMBER (Victim Name) (Amount\$)
RJN	JASON JOSEPH MAZZARESE, 98-1-00787-8
[11]	The Department of Corrections may immediately issue a Notice of Payroll Deduction. RCW 9.94A.200010
on a immedless	payments shall be made in accordance with the policies of the clerk and schedule established by the Department of Corrections, commencing diately, unless the court specifically sets forth the rate here: Not than \$ per month-commencing 9.94A.145
[]	In addition to the other costs imposed herein the Court finds that the defendant has the means to pay for the cost of incarceration and is ordered to pay such costs at the statutory rate. RCW 9.94A.145
(4)	The defendant shall pay the costs of services to collect unpaid legal financial obligations. RCW 10.73
the	financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from date of the Judgment until payment in full, at the rate applicable to l judgments. RCW 10.82.090. An award of costs on appeal against the ndant may be added to the total legal financial obligations. RCW 10.73
4.2	[] HIV TESTING. The Health Department or designee shall test and counsel the defendant for HIV as soon as possible and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. RCW 70.24.340
	Provided further the results of the HIV test are to be confidential but are to be provided to the victim, prosecuting attorney, community corrections officer and the public defender as necessary.
	[] DNA TESTING. The defendant shall have a blood sample drawn for purposes of DNA identification analysis and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The appropriate agency, the county of Department of Corrections, shall be responsible for obtaining the sample prior to the defendant's release from confinement. RCW 43.43.754
4.3	The defendant shall not use, own, or possess firearms or ammunition while under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. RCW 9.94A.120
4.4	The Defendant shall not have contact with (name, DOB) including, but not limited to, personal, verbal, telephonic, written or contact through a third party for years (not to exceed the maximum statutory sentence.)
[]	Domestic Violence Protection Order or Anti-Harassment Order is attached as Appendix 4.4.
4.5	OTHER

4.6	CONF	INEMENT OVER EAR. The defendant is ded as follows:
	(a)	CONFINEMENT. RCW 9.94A.400. Defendant is sentenced to the following term of total confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections:
		; (days) (months) on Count No;
		(days) (months) on Count No;
		(days) (months) on Count No
		Actual number of months of total confinement ordered is: 43 (Add mandatory firearm or deadly weapons enhancement time to run consecutively to other counts, see Section 2.3, Sentencing Data, above).
		[] All counts shall be served concurrently, except for the
		portion of those counts for which there is a special finding
		of a firearm or other deadly weapon as set forth above at
		Section 2.3, and the following which shall be served
		consecutively:
		The sentence herein shall run consecutively with the sentence
		in cause number(s)
		but concurrently to any other felony cause not referred to in
		this Judgment. RCW 9.94A.400. Confinement shall commence
		immediately unless otherwise set forth here: Detendant Must reform to Spokane to Jan by Augus 14, 1918 Betwee 6:00 P.M.
	(b)	The defendant shall receive credit for time served prior to
	(,	sentencing if that confinement was solely under this cause number.
		RCW 9.94A.120. The time served shall be computed by the jail
		unless the credit for time served prior to sentencing is
		specifically set forth by the court: 6 Days
4.7	plac sex agai RCW if Comm The the Depa comm	UNITY PLACEMENT AND COMMUNITY CUSTODY. RCW 9.94A.120. Community ement is ordered for a community placement eligible offense (e.g., offense, serious violent offense, second degree assault, any crime nst a person with a deadly weapon finding, Chapter 69.50 or 69.52 offense), or community custody is ordered to follow work ethic campit is imposed, and standard mandatory conditions are ordered. unity Placement is ordered for defendant shall: (1) report to and be available for contact with assigned community corrections officer as directed; (2) work at rement of Corrections-approved education, employment and/or unity service; (3) not consume controlled substances except pursuant awfully issued prescriptions; (4) not unlawfully possess controlled tances while in community custody; (5) pay supervision fees as

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (Prison)
(RCW 9.94A.110, .120) (WPF CR 84.0400 (7/95))

EXHIBIT 2

Hines Convi

	[]	The defendant shall not consume any alcohol.
	[]	Defendant shall have no contact with:
	[]	Defendant shall remain [] within [] outside of a specified geographical boundary, to wit:
	[]	The defendant shall participate in the following crime-related treatment or counseling services:
	[]	The defendant shall comply with the following crime-related prohibitions:
	[]	Other conditions:
areas a	that camp at a ethi camp days camp rema comm cust of cond IMITS	ETHIC CAMP. RCW 9.94A.137, RCW 72.09.410. The court finds defendant is eligible and is likely to qualify for work ethic and the court recommends that the defendant serve the sentence work ethic camp. If the defendant successfully completes work c camp, the department shall convert the period of work ethic confinement at the rate of one day of work ethic camp to three of total standard confinement. Upon completion of work ethic, the defendant shall be released on community custody for any ining time of total confinement, subject to the conditions of unity custody. Violation of the conditions of community cody may result in a return to total confinement for the balance the defendant's remaining time of total confinement. The litions of community custody are stated above in Section 4.7. ORDER (known drug trafficker) RCW 10.66.020. The following of the limits to the defendant while under the supervision of the or Department of Corrections:

V. NOTICES AND SIGNATURES

- 5.1 COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT. Any petition or motion for collateral attack on this judgment and sentence, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeas corpus petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment, must be filed within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as provided for in RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090
- 5.2 LENGTH OF SUPERVISION. The defendant shall remain under the court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a period up to ten years from the date of sentence or release from confinement, whichever is longer, to assure payment of all legal financial obligations. RCW 9.94A.145.
- 5.3 NOTICE OF INCOME-WITHHOLDING ACTION. If the court has not ordered an immediate notice of payroll deduction in paragraph 4.1, you are notified that the Department of Corrections may issue a notice of payroll deduction without notice to you if you are more than 30 days past due in monthly payments in an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month. RCW 9.94A.200010. Other incomewithholding action under RCW 9.94A may be taken without further notice. RCW 9.94A.200030
- 5.4 RESTITUTION HEARING.
 [] Defendant waives any right to be present at any restitution hearing (sign initials):______
- 5.5 Any violation of this Judgment and Sentence is punishable by up to 60 days of confinement per violation. RCW 9.94A.200

Cross off if not applicable:

5.6 FIREARMS. You may not own, use or possess any firearm unless your right to do so is restored by a court of record. (The court clerk shall forward a copy of the defendant's driver's license, identicard, or comparable identification, to the Department of Licensing along with the date of conviction or commitment). RCW 9.41.040, 9.41.047

WORKING CORVase 2:03-cr-02023-SAB ECF No. 146 filed 12/08/15 PageID.489 Page 48 of 61 DONE in Open Court in the presence of the defendant this 14th day of July_____,1998. CHRISTIAN J. PHELPS Attorney for Defendant Defendant Deputy Prosecuting Attorney WSBA#75F7C WSBA # 25196 Translator signature/Print name: I am a certified interpreter of, or the court has found me otherwise qualified to interpret, the ______language, which to defendant understands. I translated this Judgment and Sentence for the _language, which the defendant into that language.

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (Felony)

(RCW 9.94A.110, .120) (WPF CR 84.0400 (7/95))

Page 9

CAUSE NUMBER of this case: 98-	1-00786-0.		
T.			, Clerk of this Court,
I, certify that the foregoing is and Sentence in the above-enti	a full, t tled actio	rue and on, now or	correct copy of the Judgment n record in this office.
WITNESS my hand and seal of th	e said Sup	erior Cou	urt affixed this date:
<u></u> •			
Clerk of said County and State	, by:		, Deputy Clerk
IDENT	IFICATION	OF DEFENI	DANT
SID No. 013200147	Date of Bi	rth	
(If no SID take fingerpri	nt card for	r State P	eatrol)
FBI No. 984175HA3	Local ID	No. 0252830	
PCN No.		Other	
Alias name	, ss	5N	DOB
Race:		Ethnicit	
[] Asian/ []Black/ Pacific African-	[]		ispanic [] Male
Pacific African- Islander American	Caucasia		
[] Native []Other: American		_ [] No	on- [] Female ispanic
FINGERPRINTS I attest that I saw taffix his or her fingerprints and s	ignature the	reto.//	
Clerk of the Court: THOMAS R. FALL	Quist, Carny C		Deputy Clerk. Dated:
DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE: Paul M	6		
Left 4 fingers taken	Left	Right	Right 4 fingers taken
simultaneously	Thumb	Thumb	simultaneously

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (Felony)

(RCW 9.94A.110, .120)(WPF CR 84.0400 (7/95))

Page (ð

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE (Felony) (JS)
(RCW 9.94A.110,.120) (WPF CR 84.0400 (6/9))

EXHIBIT 2

Substances was returned on Count(s) ______, RCW 69.50.401 and RCW 69.50.435, taking place in a school, school bus, within 1000 feet of the perimeter of a school grounds or within 1000 feet of a school bus route stop designated by the school district; or in a public park, in a public transit vehicle, or in a public transit stop shelter; or in, or within 1000 feet of the perimeter of, a civic center designated as a drug-free zone by a local government authority, or in a public housing project designated by a local governing authority as a drug-free zone.

- The defendant was convicted of **vehicular homicide** which was proximately caused by a person driving a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drug or by the operation of a vehicle in a reckless manner and is therefore a violent offense. RCW 9.94A.030
- [] This case involves kidnapping in the first degree, kidnapping in the second degree, or unlawful imprisonment as defined in chapter 9A.40 RCW, where the victim is a minor and the offender is not the minor's parent. RCW 9A.44.130.
- [] The court finds that the offender has a chemical dependency that has contributed to the offense(s). RCW 9.94A.
- [] Current offenses encompassing the same criminal conduct and counting as one crime in determining the offender score are (RCW 9.94A.400):
- [] Other current convictions listed under different cause numbers used in calculating the offender score are (list offense and cause number):
- 2.2 CRIMINAL HISTORY: (RCW 9.94A.360):

Crime	Date	Crime Type	Adult or Juy	Place of	Conviction	Sent. Date
	Crime	-16				

SEE PAGE 3 OF THIS DOCUMENT

- [] Additional criminal history is attached in Appendix 2.2
- [] The defendant committed a current offense while on community placement (adds one point to score). RCW 9.94A.360

CRIME	DATE OF CRIME	CRIME TYPE	ADULT OR JUVENILE	COUNTY OF CONVICTION	SENT. DATE
BURGLARY 2	1-22-86	NV	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	3-3-86
BURGLARY 2*	3-8-86	NV	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	5-15-86
BURGLARY 2 *	2-10-86	NV	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	5-15-86
BURGLARY 2 *	2-21-86	NV	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	5-15-86
BURGLARY 2 *	2-22-86	NV	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	5-15-86
BURGLARY 2*	3-1-86	NA	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	.5-15-86
BURGLARY 2 *	3-3-86	NV	JUVENILE	YAKIMA	5-15-86
BURGLARY 2 *	3-8-86	NV	JUVENILE	BENTON	5-15-86
PCS-COCAINE	1-15-88	NV	ADULT	YAKIMA	4-8-88
BURGLARY 2	2-20-89	NA	ADULT	G. HARBOR	6-14-89
BURGLARY 2	2-22-89	NV	ADULT	G. HARBOR	6-14-89
BURGLARY 2	2-18-89	NV	ADULT	G. HARBOR	6-14-89
BURGLARY 2	2-7-89	NV	ADULT	G. HARBOR	6-14-89
BURGLARY 2	2-22-89	NV	ADULT	G. HARBOR	6-14-89
BURGLARY 2	2-20-89	NV	ADULT	G. HARBOR	6-14-89
			West Search		

- offense for purposes of determining the offender score (RCW 9.94A.360):
 - [] The following prior convictions are not counted as points but as enhancements pursuant to RCW 46.61.520:

CT NO	OFFENDER SCORE	SERIOUSNES S LEVEL	STANDARD RANGE (not including enhancements)	Plus enhancement s*	Total STANDAR D RANGE (including enhancement s)	MAXIMU M TERM
I	"15"	III	51-68 mornes	NA	51-68 marrey	10 (CALS,
				Malla Maria		
one	and (VH) Ve	ehicular Homio	cide, see RC	ing (D), VUCSA 4 46.61.520.		protect
. 4	[] EXCEPTIONAL SENTENCE: Substantial and compelling reasons exist which justify an exceptional sentence [] above [] within [below the standard range for Count(s) Findings of fact and conclusions of law are attached in Appendix 2.4. The Prosecuting Attorney [] did [] did not recommend a similar sentence.					
2.5	the total ability to financial will chang likely fut	amount owing, pay legal fi resources and e. The court	the defenda nancial obli the likelih finds that	GATIONS. The nt's past, pr gations, inclood that the the defendant gal financial	esent and uding the defendant' has the a	future defenda s statu: bility
	[] The fresti	following extr itution inappr	raordinary coropriate (RCM	ircumstances e	exist that	make
. 6	For violen	t offenses, m	ost serious agreements c	offenses, or r plea agreem	armed offe	nders
	[] attach	ed or [] as	follows			
	Tain la		III. JUDG	SMENT		
.1	2.1 and Ap	pendix 2.1	of the Cour	nts and Charge		n parag
					-MA-TION	
. 2	[X] The C	Court DISMISSE	S Counts I	op-Amended Inf		

IV. SENTENCE AND ORD

IT IS ORDERED:

4.1 Defendant shall pay to the Clerk of the Court

	\$ 434.56	Restitution to: HEPLING'S PARM SURLY		
JASS CODE	\$	Restitution to:		
RTN/RJN	\$	Restitution to: (Name and Address-address may be withheld and provided confidentially to Clerk's Office)		
PCV	\$500.00	Victim Assessment RCW 7.68.035		
CRC	Court costs, including: RCW 9.94A.030, 9.94A.120, 10.01.160, 10.46.190			
		Criminal Filing fee \$		
		Witness costs \$ WFR		
		Sheriff service fees \$sfr/sfs/sfw/srf		
		Jury demand fee \$		
		Other \$		
PUB	\$	Fees for court appointed attorney RCW 9.94A.030		
WRF	\$	Court appointed defense expert and other defense costs RCW 9.94A.030		
FCM/MTH	\$	Fine RCW 9A.20.021; [] VUCSA additional fine deferred due to indigency RCW 69.50.430		
CDF/LDI/ FCD/NTF/SAD/SDI	\$	Drug enforcement fund ofRCW 9.94A.030		
CLF	\$	Crime lab fee [] deferred due to indigency RCW 43.43.690		
EXT	\$	Extradition costs RCW 9.94A.120		
	\$	Emergency response costs (Vehicular Assault, Vehicular Homicide only, \$1,000 maximum) RCW 38.52.430		
	\$	Other costs for:		
	\$ 1044,56	TOTAL RCW 9.94A.145		
	financi court. 9.94A.1 [] sh	ve total does not include all restitution or other legal al obligations, which may be set by later order of the An agreed restitution order may be entered. RCW 42. A restitution hearing: all be set by the prosecutor scheduled for		

		[大]	RESTITU N. Schedule attached, App ix 4.1
		[X] with	
N		NAME	of other defendant CAUSE NUMBER (Victim Name) (Amount\$) JASON JOSEPH MAZZARSE 78-1-0-787-8 HEPLING'S \$434.56
			FARMSURY
		[*]	The Department of Corrections may immediately issue a Notice of Payroll Deduction. RCW 9.94A.200010
		[X]	All payments shall be made in accordance with the policies of the clerk and on a schedule established by the Department of Corrections, commencing immediately, unless the court specifically sets forth the rate here: Not less than \$
		[]	In addition to the other costs imposed herein the Court finds that the defendant has the means to pay for the cost of incarceration and is ordered to pay such costs at the statutory rate. RCW 9.94A.145
		[X]	The defendant shall pay the costs of services to collect unpaid legal financial obligations. RCW 36.18.190
		[*]	The financial obligations imposed in this judgment shall bear interest from the date of the Judgment until payment in full, a the rate applicable to civil judgments. RCW 10.82.090. An award of costs on appeal against the defendant may be added to the total legal financial obligations. RCW 10.73
	4.2	[]	HIV TESTING. The Health Department or designee shall test and counsel the defendant for HIV as soon as possible and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. RCW 70.24.340
		[]	DNA TESTING. The defendant shall have a blood sample drawn for purposes of DNA identification analysis and the defendant shall fully cooperate in the testing. The appropriate agency, the county or Department of Corrections, shall be responsible for obtaining the sample prior to the defendant's release from confinement. RCW 43.43.754
	4.3	The	Defendant shall not have contact with
		[]	Domestic Violence Protection Order or Anti-Harassment Order is attached as Appendix 4.3.
	4.4	OTHE	ir

4.5	CONF	NEMENT OVER O YEAR. The defendant	is sen ced as follows:					
	(a)	CONFINEMENT. RCW 9.94A.400. Defeterm of total confinement in total corrections:	endant is sentenced to the follows: the custody of the Department	ing of				
		(days) (months) on Count	No;					
		(days) (months) on Count	No;					
		(days) (months) on Count	No					
		Actual number of months of tot Si (Add enhancement time to run consecutive	mandatory firearm or deadly weap	ons				
		Sentencing Data, above).	in the second se					
		All counts shall be served concurre counts for which there is a special weapon as set forth above at Sectio counts which shall be served consec	finding of a firearm or other dead n 2.3, and except for the following	dly				
				-•				
		The sentence herein shall run conse	cutively with the sentence in cause	е				
		number(s) any other felony cause not referred	but concurrently to in this Judgment. RCW 9.94A.4					
		Confinement shall commence immediately unless otherwise set forth here						
	(b)							
		if that confinement was solely under this cause number. RCW 9.9 The time served shall be computed by the jail unless the credit						
		served prior to sentencing is specifically set forth by the						
			ETMENT OF COLLECTIONS.	- .				
4.6	[]	COMMUNITY PLACEMENT is ordered on		hs.				
	[]	for the period of earned release aw and (2), whichever is longer, and so ordered. [See RCW 9.94A.120(9) for serious violent offense, second deg person with a deadly weapon finding Community custody follows a term for Use paragraph 4.7 to impose community	rarded pursuant to RCW 9.94A.150(1) standard mandatory conditions are community placement offenses—gree assault, any crime against a g, Chapter 69.50 or 69.52 RCW offen or a sex offense—RCW 9.94A.120(10)	ıse.				
		camp.] While on community placement or com (1) report to and be available for corrections officer as directed; (2 approved education, employment and/ controlled substances except pursua (4) not unlawfully possess controll custody; (5) pay supervision fees a	contact with the assigned communit 2) work at Department of Correction for community service; (3) not cons ant to lawfully issued prescription led substances while in community	y is- sume				
JUDG (RCW	MENT AN	ID SENTENCE (JS) (Prison) 110,.120) (WPF CR 84.0400 (8/99))	Page 5 %					

i) perform affirmative acts

to the prior approval of the Department of Corrections while in

compliance with the orders of the court as required by the Department of Corrections. The residence location and living arrangements are subject

Corrections.

	community placement or community custody. Community custody for sex offenders may be extended for up to the statutory maximum term of the sentence. Violation of community custody imposed for a sex offense may result in additional confinement.
	[] The defendant shall not consume any alcohol. [] Defendant shall have no contact with:
	[] Defendant shall remain [] within [] outside of a specified geographical boundary, to wit:
	The defendant shall participate in the following crime-related treatment or counseling services:
	[] The defendant shall comply with the following crime-related prohibitions:
	Other conditions may be imposed by the court or Department during community custody, or are set forth here:
4.7 []	WORK ETHIC CAMP. RCW 9.94A.137, RCW 72.09.410. The court finds that defendant is eligible and is likely to qualify for work ethic camp and the court recommends that the defendant serve the sentence at a work ethic camp. Upon completion of work ethic camp, the defendant shall be released on community custody for any remaining time of total confinement, subject to the conditions below. Violation of the conditions of community custody may result in a return to total confinement for the balance of the defendant's remaining time of total confinement. The conditions of community custody are stated above in Section 4.6.
are	LIMITS ORDER (known drug trafficker) RCW 10.66.020. The following areas off limits to the defendant while under the supervision of the County or Department of Corrections:

essary to monitor

V. NOTICES AND SIGNATURE

- 5.1 COLLATERAL ATTACK ON JUDGMENT. Any petition or motion for collateral attack on this judgment and sentence, including but not limited to any personal restraint petition, state habeas corpus petition, motion to vacate judgment, motion to withdraw guilty plea, motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment, must be filed within one year of the final judgment in this matter, except as provided for in RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090
- 5.2 LENGTH OF SUPERVISION. The defendant shall remain under the court's jurisdiction and the supervision of the Department of Corrections for a period up to ten years, which may be extended up to twenty years from the date of sentence or release from confinement, whichever is longer, to assure payment of all legal financial obligations. RCW 9.94A.145.
- 5.3 NOTICE OF INCOME-WITHHOLDING ACTION. If the court has not ordered an immediate notice of payroll deduction in paragraph 4.1, you are notified that the Department of Corrections may issue a notice of payroll deduction without notice to you if you are more than 30 days past due in monthly payments in an amount equal to or greater than the amount payable for one month. RCW 9.94A.200010. Other income-withholding action under RCW 9.94A may be taken without further notice. RCW 9.94A.200030
- 5.4 RESTITUTION HEARING.
 [] Defendant waives any right to be present at any restitution hearing (sign initials):
- 5.5 Any violation of this Judgment and Sentence is punishable by up to 60 days of confinement per violation. RCW 9.94A.200
- 5.6 FIREARMS. You must immediately surrender any concealed pistol license and you may not own, use or possess any firearm unless your right to do so is restored by a court of record. (The court clerk shall forward a copy of the defendant's license, identicard, or comparable identification, to the Department of Licensing along with the date of conviction or commitment). RCW 9.41.040, 9.41.047.

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Attorney for Defendant WSBA # 25196

WSBA#

PAUL EDWARD HINES

Defendant

Translator signature/Print name:

I am a certified interpreter of, or the court has found me otherwise qualified language, which the defendant to interpret, the understands. I translated this Judgment and Sentence for the defendant into that language.

CAUSE NUMBER of this ca . 98-1-0	0786-0.					
I, the foregoing is a full, true and the above-entitled action, now on	d correct record i	, Clerk copy of t n this off	of this Court, certify that the Judgment and Sentence in Fice.			
WITNESS my hand and seal of the said Superior Court affixed this date:						
·						
Clerk of said County and State,			, Deputy Clerk			
		OF DEFEND	DANT			
SID No. 013200147 Date	of Birth					
(If no SID take fingerprint	card for	State Patr	col)			
FBI No. 984175HA3	Local	ID No. 02	252830			
PCN No.		Other				
Alias name , SSN DOE		-				
Race:		Ethr	nicity: Sex:			
an-	[]Caucasia		ispanic [] Male			
American						
[] Native []Other: American		[] No hispar				
FINGERPRINTS I attest that I saw this document affix his or her fi	the same	e defendan s and sig	t who appeared in Court on nature thereto.			
Clerk of the Court:	to Or	Dej	puty Clerk.			
Dated: 1-12- 2000						
DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE:	1926_	`.				
Left 4 fingers taken simultaneously	Left Thumb	Right Thumb	Right 4 fingers taken simultaneously			
are a status memoral tales. TERITA						
DEC 0.8 2015						